Email About Fallowing

From: Brett Bricker [mailto:bricker312@gmail.com]
Sent: 12 December 2008 00:18
To: Miller, John
Subject: WTO and Cotton

In reference to your recent Doha article (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122878482492690101.html?mod=googlenews_wsj), I have a couple of questions:

While it seems politically infeasible for the US to cut a substantial portion of cotton subsidies, do you think there is anything else the US could do to appease Brazil and other countries that are fighting against our domestic subsidies? For example, the WorldWatch Institute has written that the Federal Government could institute a procurement policy in which the government would purchase excess subsidized cotton to return cotton prices to what they would be absent government intervention. Do you think the international reaction to this would be enough to overcome opposition to subsidies, or is something more symbolic necessary? Thank you very much for your time.

-Brett Bricker, University of Kansas

Hi Brett,

Thanks for the note. The world watch institute idea would satisfy trading partners, but I suspect it would be expensive, and the cotton farmers might not go for it. It would expose the absurdity of paying farmers to produce less. right now, cotton is one of the hurdles to doha, but it's one among many.

all the best,

John.

Line-by-Line Email Conversation about Amazon

Dear Brett,

You are to be commended on selecting an interesting and complicated topic for your research. Some brief, and probably incomplete, answers...

At 12:05 PM 9/3/2008, you wrote:
Dr. Merry - I am a student at the University of Kansas, and am doing an extensive study of the impact of US agricultural subsidies and support. One area that is of keen interest to me is the support to the domestic biofuel sector - specifically, the tariff on imported sugarcane ethanol from Brazil. I'm considering writing a policy proposition, and am hoping that you will have some thoughts or guidance.

First, do you think that lifting the tariff would have a negative impact on the Amazon? Even if farmers don't grow directly on Amazonian land, does expanded demand have the potential to push cattle ranchers or small farmers into the Amazon?

No, I don't think lifting the tariff will have a massive direct negative impact on land use in the Amazon. This is mostly because there are barriers or conflicts that may dampen the direct link between the ethanol tariff and land use in the Amazon.

Some questions that lead to uncertainty in the land use response would be something along the lines of....How much of the US market share can the Brazilian producers expect to capture? How will removal of tariffs affect the demand for ethanol? How will this reflect in local prices for this and alternative products for that land area, as well as for market substitutes?

Secondly, while there will be a strong push in the future for ethanol from sugarcane, there is a large productive area to be used and there are efficiencies in cattle production (in particular) that may increase intensity from 1 to 2 or 3 head per ha. So the impact will not be a replacement of 1 ha of added sugarcane for one ha of forest. While we may see additional pressure, the markets for carbon credits, stronger governance, and better monitoring will all play into determining the eventual land use change (or status).


Second (and probably contingent), should the United States establish a form of quid pro quo with the Brazilian government? I haven't seen much literature on this, but it seems like the United States could make a reasonable demand that: "we will only lift the tariff if you agree to increased protection of the Amazon against agricultural invasion." Do you think that this is feasible, and what do you think the reaction of the Brazilian government would be?


I think that this would be absolutely infeasible. How would you measure it? It is inefficient from an economic perspective and finally, given that the US is the largest emitter of greenhouse gasses, a difficult negotiating position.

best wishes,
Frank

Email Conversation #1

Dear Brett:





Lifting the tariff on imported sugarcane ethanol from Brazil could, indeed,
result in displacement of cattle ranches in the cane-growing regions,
pushing ranching into the Amazon region. However, that also may be
happening as a result of US subsidies for corn-ethanol. US soybean
production has decreased in the USA in order to meet demand for corn, and
Brazil has responded with increased soybean production, which potentially
has the same effect on the Amazon as expanding cane production. If the
cane-ethanol tariff is removed, would corn-ethanol become less competitive,
so that more soybeans would be planted in the USA again? In my opinion,
corn-ethanol should not be subsidized either directly, or indirectly through
tariffs on cane-ethanol. Removing the tariff would remove at least one
contributor to the perverse incentives currently present to grow corn for
ethanol.

Intensification of cattle production in Brazil is another opportunity to
meet current and rising demand for meat without requiring new forest
clearing. To some extent, this is already happening.

My guess is that the Brazilian government would react very negatively to a
quid quo pro. They are very sensitive about sovereignty, and especially
about foreign meddling in the Amazon. Modified market forces, such as
demand for soybeans and cane products that are grown with best management
practices, are emerging now. Also, the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation
and Degradation (REDD) process is now developing, that may provide an
additional market incentive to maintain forest carbon. Perhaps a
negotiating strategy for the new US administration might be to work towards
Brazil's cooperation with REDD negotiations in return for reducing cane
import tariffs. That may be naive, wishful thinking on my part, but it
would make sense.

If you are willing to share any of the output of your study, I'd be
delighted to see it.

Good luck,

Eric





Eric A. Davidson
Senior Scientist
The Woods Hole Research Center
149 Woods Hole Road
Falmouth, MA 02540-1644 USA

508-540-9900 ext 132
508-540-9700 (FAX)

edavidson@whrc.org
http://www.whrc.org









-----Original Message-----
From: Bricker, Brett Jacob [mailto:bbricker@ku.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2008 12:09 PM
To: edavidson@whrc.org
Subject: Ethanol and Impacts on the Amazon


Dr. Davidson - I am a student at the University of Kansas, and am doing an
extensive study of the impact of US agricultural subsidies and support. One
area that is of keen interest to me is the support to the domestic biofuel
sector - specifically, the tariff on imported sugarcane ethanol from Brazil.
I'm considering writing a policy proposition, and am hoping that you will
have some thoughts or guidance.

First, do you think that lifting the tariff would have a negative impact on
the Amazon? Even if farmers don't grow directly on Amazonian land, does
expanded demand have the potential to push cattle ranchers or small farmers
into the Amazon?

Second (and probably contingent), should the United States establish a form
of quid pro quo with the Brazilian government? I haven't seen much
literature on this, but it seems like the United States could make a
reasonable demand that: "we will only lift the tariff if you agree to
increased protection of the Amazon against agricultural invasion." Do you
think that this is feasible, and what do you think the reaction of the
Brazilian government would be?

Leaving it On the Table - Original

In your most recent article, Attack Iran and you attack Russia, you write - that an attack on Iran would be viewed by Moscow as an attack on them. My question is, do you think that even leaving an attack "on the table" has the ability to rupture relations between the US and Russia, especially if the US ratchets up new threats in the near future? Thanks for any information, I enjoyed your writing immensely

Leaving It On the Table

Thanks a lot for your email. US-Russia relations are
already immensely strained - as Putin and his inner
circle see it. This Caspian summit was vastly
significant for both Russia and Iran. It opened the
way for Iran to join the SCO. And it reinforced
regional powers' sway over Central Asia - which the
Bush admn. virtually "lost". Not to mention
Azerbaijan as a base for attacks on Iran (and for
rattling Moscow's nerves).


For all their autocratic tendencies Putin and his
circle see the cold war as always ON. It is easy to
understand their point. The SCO will be bigger and
bigger - the NATO of the East... And it will cement a
very important strategic partnerhsip uniting China,
Russia and Iran under the same umbrella. I wonder what
a Hillary admn. would do to revert the confrontational
approach of the Bush admn. The Russians are taking no
chances - even with an attack on Iran "only" on the
table. They remain infinitely wary of all US designs
east of the Urals.
All the best, Pepe

Israeli Response?

It is likely that Israel would be more nervous about an Iranian nuclear
capability if the United States normalized relations with Tehran. But it
would be difficult for Israel to launch an attack without U.S.
cooperation. Indeed, striking the more than one-dozen (known) nuclear
facilities in Iran (some of which are hardened facilities)would be
several orders of magnitude more difficult than the Israeli strike
against the single Iraqi facility (Osirak) in 1981. Moreover, it would
be nearly impossible for Israel to conduct such a mission without
traversing Iraqi air space--which is, of course, controlled by the
United States. Consequently, although Israel might have a greater
incentive to take action against Iran following a U.S. normalization of
relations with Tehran, there would be daunting obstacles to executing
such a strategy.

Best regards,

-----Original Message-----
From: Bricker, Brett Jacob [mailto:bbricker@ku.edu]
Sent: Sunday, July 29, 2007 4:48 PM
To: Ted Carpenter
Subject: Questions about a Nuclear Iran

Dr. Carpenter - I have been reading your recent publications regarding
Iran's nuclear capabilities, and the US response. Specifically, in
"Rethinking Non-Proliferation", you write that the United States should
normalize relations with Iran.

The question that I have regards Israel's response to such a
proposition. Do you think that this would risk the US-Israel alliance?
More importantly, if the United States pledged not to attack Iran, do
you think that there is a higher likelihood Israel would pre-emptively
attack Iran?

Thanks for any remarks, and I look forward to future publications.

-Brett Bricker, University of Kansas

Lebanon Debt Relief

I am writing you with reference to your email sent to Marwan Barakat regarding bilateral debt between Lebanon and the US.

Official data shows that, at end-2006, only US$ 1 million was lent by the US to Lebanon through the US-government EXIM Bank. On the other hand, the US pledged during the Paris III conference US$ 890 million of grants, in the form of private sector support, in-kind technical assistance, budgetary support, and UN/NGOs support.

It is worth mentioning that the bulk of Lebanon’s foreign debt is in market Eurobonds. These accounted for around 67% of total foreign currency debt at mid-2007. Some 12% were Paris II related Eurobonds and loans (with nothing pertaining to the US), and 9% are also Paris II related Eurobonds held by the Central Bank.

Most of the data is available on the Ministry of Finance website (www.finance.gov.lb). Check under the publications section the “Public Finance Monitor” periodical and under the public finance section the foreign debt distribution section.

I hope this answered your question. Should you need any further information, do not hesitate to contact me.

Zeina Abla
Head of Economic Research Unit
Research Department
Bank Audi - Audi Saradar Group
P.O. Box 11-2560 ? Beirut 1107 2808 ? Lebanon
Phone: +961 1 977 407 ?Fax: +961 1 985 622
web: www.audi.com.lb